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United States v. Doe: The Supreme Court and
the Fifth Amendment
Dan K Webb* and James R. Ferguson**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Last Term, in United States v. Doe,' the Supreme Court held
that the business records of a sole proprietor are not protected by
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.' With this
holding, the Court took a major step toward embracing a uniform
principle governing the application of the fifth amendment to subpoenaed records.3 Under that principle, the contents of such
Partner, Winston and Strawn, Chicago, Illinois; United States Attorney, Northern
District of Illinois (1981-85). J.D. 1970, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
** Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois. J.D. 1976,
Northwestern University School of Law.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the Department of Justice or any other agency of the United States
government.
The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Vincent J. Connelly, Scott
F. Turow and James B. Haddad, and the valuable research assistance of Joan Fickinger.
1. 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984).
2. In relevant part, the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Many commentators feel that the rationale of the Doe holding-a rationale first
used by the Court in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)-applies with equal
force to all pre-existing records, including the personal records of individuals. See, e.g.,
Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd- Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger
Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343, 344 (1979); McKenna, The ConstitutionalProtection of
Private Papers: The Role of a HierarchicalFourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J., 55, 67
(1977); Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court'sDefinition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 397 (1977); Note, The Rights of CriminalDefendants and
the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV.,
683, 694 (1982).
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case involving the fifth amendment and
private papers. Indeed, in Doe the Court pointedly noted that all of the subpoenaed
documents "pertained to respondent's business." 104 . Ct. at 1241 n.7. Recently, however, the Fourth Circuit held that the fifth amendment prevents the government from
subpoenaing an individual's incriminating personal papers that are in his possession and
held by him in an individual capacity. United States v. John Doe No. 462, 745 F.2d 834
(4th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case but later vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss the
cause as moot. United States v. John Doe, 105 S. Ct. 1861 (1985).
See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3d Cir. 1980) (fifth
amendment protects an accused from government-compelled disclosure of self-incriminating private papers, such as diaries and personal letters). But see Fagan v. United
*
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records are not protected by the privilege against compelled selfincrimination if the "party asserting the privilege has voluntarily
compiled the documents." 4
The emergence of this doctrine raises an important question in
fifth amendment law: what, if anything, does the principle reveal
about the Court's view of the policy and values underlying the
privilege against self-incrimination? It is the major purpose of this
article to suggest that the Doe holding is fully consistent with a
view of the privilege as a means of promoting the integrity of the
truth-seeking enterprise in the criminal justice system.
To this end, Part I of the article reviews the Supreme Court's
earlier decisions dealing with documentary subpoenas and the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment. In Part III, the article examines the Doe opinion and traces its roots to the rationale of
the Court's earlier decisions. Part IV dicusses the three theories
commonly used to explain the purpose and values of the privilege
against self-incrimination. In Part V, the Article analyzes the Doe
opinion from the standpoint of each of the three theories, concluding that the "truth-seeking" rationale is most consistent with the
logic and holding of the Court's decision.
II.

DOCUMENTARY SUBPOENAS AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Doe can be
fully analyzed only by first reviewing the Court's earlier efforts to
determine what limits the fifth amendment imposes on the government's ability to obtain documents through legal compulsion. This
question first arose in Boyd v. United States,5 an 1886 case that still
stands as a landmark decision in fifth amendment law.
In Boyd, the federal government brought a forfeiture action to
recover thirty-five cases of plate glass after a partnership allegedly
imported the glass without paying customs dues.6 At trial, the
government obtained a court order requiring the partners to proStates, 545 F.2d 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 1977) (fifth amendment protection does not amount
to a general nrivilege for rivate papers; rathr,the pliticge can be invoked "only when
the actual preparation of the documents or the making of the written declarations which
they contain, has been compelled").
4. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1242 n.10.
5. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). For a useful discussion of Boyd and its underlying legal philosophy, see Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951-64 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Harvard Note).
6. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18.
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duce an invoice supplied by the shipper.7 After the partners disclosed the invoice, the jury returned a verdict for the government,
and the court entered a judgment of forfeiture against the property.8 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the court-ordered production of the invoice was
unconstitutional under both the fourth and fifth amendments. 9 In
reaching this result, the Court broadly declared that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment prohibits "any forcible
and compulsory production of a man's own testimony or private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime."'"
While Boyd quickly assumed its place as a major precedent in
fifth amendment law, the Supreme Court began almost immediately to limit the application of Boyd's fifth amendment rationale.
This development was first evident in a series of cases in which the
Court held that an individual could not rely on the fifth amendment to avoid producing the records of a collective entity. Thus, in
Wilson v. United States, I the Court held that a custodian of corporate records could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination
to justify a refusal to produce corporate books and records subpoenaed by a grand jury.' 2 Similarly, in United States v. White, 1 3 the
Court declared that an officer of a labor union could not rely on
the self-incrimination clause to bar the production of incriminating
union records. Finally, in Bellis v. United States,'4 the Court held
that a former partner of a dissolved law firm could not claim the
privilege to avoid producing the partnership's books and records.' 5
In all of these cases, the Court based its decision on the recognition that the privilege against self-incrimination should be limited
to its "historic function" of protecting only the "natural individ7. Id. at 617, 619-20.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 634-38.
10. Id. at 630.
11. 221 U.S. 361, 362 (1911).
12. In Wilson, the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the corporation. In the
companion case of Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911), the Court reached the
same result when the subpoena was directed to the individual corporate officer and required him to produce the corporate books. See also Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S.
478 (1913) (fifth amendment unavailable with respect to corporate records even though
the corporation had previously been dissolved).
13. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
14. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
15. Given that Boyd also involved a partnership, it seems clear that under Bellis the
"precise claim sustained in Boyd would now be rejected for reasons not there considered." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
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ual" from compelled self-incrimination.' 6 In Couch v. United
States,' 7 the Court carried the same logic a step further by holding
that the self-incrimination right is a "personal privilege: it adheres
basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate
him."" 8 In Couch, the Court upheld a documentary summons directing an accountant to produce the personal financial records of
the defendant.' 9 While acknowledging that the records contained
"potentially incriminating evidence," the Court stressed that the
summons was directed to the accountant, not to the defendant.20
In these circumstances, the Court reasoned, the defendant could
not rely on the self-incrimination privilege since the "ingredient of
'2
personal compulsion against an accused is lacking." '
The Court employed the same basic analysis in Andresen v.
Maryland 22 and Fisher v. United States.23 In Andresen, the Court
held that records seized in a valid search of the defendant's office
were not privileged, even though the records contained incriminating statements made by the defendant.24 In reaching this result,
the Court emphasized two facts. First, the government agents had
not required the defendant "to say or to do anything. ' 25 Second,
the records seized by the agents "contained statements that [the
defendant] had voluntarily committed to writing. ' 26 In light of
these facts, the Court found that the defendant had not been subject to governmental compulsion and therefore could not rely on
the fifth amendment.27
By the same token, in Fisherv. United States, the Court held that
the fifth amendment would not prevent the enforcement of a documentary summons requiring a taxpayer's attorney (or indeed the
taxpayer himself) to produce records prepared by a third-party
accountant.28 The Court again stressed that the contested records
16. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). See also Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974).
17. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
18. Id. at 328.
19. Id. at 336.
20. Id. at 329.
21. Id.
22

427 U.S

462(117)

23. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For a useful discussion of Fisherand Andresen as part of a
larger shift in American jurisprudence to a more "pragmatic" and "relativist" vision of
the law, see Harvard Note, supra note 5.
24. Andresen, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976).
25. Id. at 473.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In Fisher, several taxpayers who were under investigation for criminal tax viola-
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did not contain the compelled testimony of the accused and therefore did not qualify for the privilege against compelled selfincrimination. 9
The Fisher Court also indicated that the taxpayer could not rely
on the fifth amendment even if he had actually authored the document in question.30 In a footnote to its opinion, the Court declared
that "unless the government has compelled the subpoenaed individual'to write the document, the fact that it was written by him is
not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue."'" The
Court then noted that in the case of a documentary subpoena the
"only thing compelled is the act of producing the document and
the compelled act is the same as the one performed when a chattel
' 32
or document not authored by the producer is demanded.
The Fisher Court did acknowledge, however, that the very act of
33
producing records can have communicative aspects of its own.
In particular, the Court found that the compelled act of production
can constitute an implicit admission of the existence or authenticity of the subpoenaed records.34 On the facts of Fisher, however,
the Court found that the act of production was not sufficiently testimonial to warrant the protection of the fifth amendment.35
Against the backdrop of Fisher,Andresen and Couch, the case of
United States v. Doe began working its way through the federal
courts. The case arose when a sole proprietor resisted compliance
with several grand jury subpoenas requiring him to produce proprietorship records in his possession. The case thus provided the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to apply the rationale of
tions obtained certain documents from their accountants pertaining to the accountants'
preparation of their tax returns. Thereafter, the taxpayers transferred the documents to
their respective attorneys to assist the taxpayers in connection with the investigation.
Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service served summonses on the attorneys directing
them to produce the documents, but the attorneys refused to comply. See Fisher, 425
U.S. 391, 393-96 (1976).
On these facts, the Supreme Court found that the attorney-client privilege would apply
to any documents held by the attorneys that would have been privileged in the hands of
the client under the fifth amendment. For this reason, the Court was required to determine whether the "documents could have been obtained by summons addressed to the
taxpayer while the documents were in his possession." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405.
29. Id. at 409-10.
30. Id. at 410.
31. Id. at 410 n.ll.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 410. In this respect, the Fisher Court adopted Wigmore's theory of "implicit authentication." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264, at 380 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). Accord 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264, at 363-64 (3d ed. 1940).
34. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
35. Id. at 410-11.
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Fisher,Andresen and Couch to the broad question of whether the
fifth amendment bars the enforcement of a grand jury subpoena
compelling an individual to produce his own records in his
possession.
III.

UNITED STATES V.

DOE

In the fall of 1980, a federal grand jury in Hudson County, New
Jersey began a lengthy investigation into allegations of corruption
in the awarding of municipal contracts in the Newark area.3 6 As
part of its investigation, the grand jury issued five subpoenas to
"John Doe," the sole proprietor of several companies that did business with various units of local government.37 In those subpoenas,
the grand jury commanded Doe to produce a wide range of business and financial records pertaining to the operation of his several
firms.3"
Doe resisted compliance. In a motion filed with the District
Court for the District of New Jersey, he sought to quash the sub36. Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.N.J.
1981).
37. Id. at 2. The district court's opinion identified "Doe" as Milton Reid.
38. Id. The first two subpoenas were issued on November 19, 1980, and required
production of (1) the telephone toll records of several companies of which Doe was a
principal and (2) all records, including bank statements and cancelled checks, for the
period January 1, 1977, to present for four accounts held by Doe or his companies. Id.
On November 25, 1980, the grand jury issued a third subpoena calling for production
of "any and all records as per the Attached Schedule A for the Eastern Equipment Supply Company for the period January 1, 1976 to present." Id. at 2. The categories of
records sought by this subpoena were as follows:
(1) general ledgers; (2) general journals; (3) cash disbursement journals; (4)
petty cash books and vouchers; (5) purchase journals; (6) vouchers; (7) paid
bills; (8) invoices; (9) cash receipts journal; (10) billing; (11) bank statements;
(12) cancelled checks and check stubs; (13) payroll records; (14) contracts and
copies of contracts, including all retainer agreements; (15) financial statements;
(16) bank deposit tickets; (17) retained copies of partnership income tax returns;
(18) retained copies of payroll tax returns; (19) accounts payable ledger; (20)
accounts receivable ledger; (2 1) telephone company statement of calls and telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; (22) records of all escrow, trust, or fiduciary
accounts maintained on behalf of clients; (23) safe deposit box records; (24)
records of all purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; (25) names and home
addfesses uf all partners, associates, and employees; (26) W-2 forms of each
partner, associate, and employee; (27) workpapers; and (28) copies of tax
returns.
United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984).
A fourth subpoena was issued on December 19, 1980, seeking access to a list of documents pertaining to High Point Equipment and Supply Company. 541 F. Supp. at 2.
Finally, on December 29, 1980, Doe was directed to produce bank statements and cancelled checks for the period January 1, 1976, to present for various company accounts
maintained at an off-shore bank. Id.
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poenas by invoking the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.3 9 He argued in particular that the forced production of the
business records of a sole proprietor would violate the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. °
The district court agreed. While noting that the fifth amendment does not protect the records of most business entities,4 ' the
court found that the compelled act of production would require
Doe to "admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and that they are authentic."42 The court therefore concluded that the subpoenas could not be enforced except as to
records required by law to be kept or to be disclosed to a public
agency.43
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling." In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied
in part on the "act of production" rationale of the district judge.
The court thus agreed that the compelled act of production, by
forcing Doe to admit implicitly the existence and authenticity of
the records, would have certain "communicative aspects" that
warranted protection.45
As a separate ground for affirming the judge's order, the Third
Circuit also held that the contents of the records were themselves
protected by the fifth amendment.46 To reach this conclusion, the
court employed a two-step analysis. First, relying on Boyd v.
United States, the court held that the private records of an individual are protected from compulsory disclosure by the privilege
against self-incrimination.4 7 Second, the court reasoned that the
business records of an individual owner are essentially "no different" from the private papers of that owner.48 The court therefore
concluded that an "individual's business papers, as well as his per39. 541 F. Supp. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Citing Bellis, the district court specifically stated that "[a]lthough the Fifth
Amendment does not protect the records of corporations, unincorporated associations or
partnerships, a sole proprietor can invoke the privilege to his benefit." 541 F. Supp. at 2.
42. 541 F. Supp. at 3.
43. Id. The district court identified tax returns and W-2 statements as examples of
documents falling within this category. Id.
44. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 334-36.
46. Id. at 333-34.
47. Id. at 333.
48. The quoted phrase is borrowed from the Supreme Court's discussion of the Third
Circuit's decision. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1240.
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sonal records, cannot be subpoenaed by a grand jury."4 9 In this
posture-with the district court and the Third Circuit both declining to enforce the subpoenas-the case came to the Supreme
Court.
In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's holding that the contents of the subpoenaed records were constitutionally protected. The Court began
with a clear statement of its major premise. "As we noted in
Fisher," the Court wrote, "the Fifth Amendment only protects the
person asserting the privilege from compelled self-incrimination."50
The Court then turned to the facts of the case at hand. It first
49. Doe, 680 F.2d at 334. In so ruling, the Third Circuit relied on its recent decision
in ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
The Third Circuit also rejected the government's claim that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the government's representation that it would not use the act of
production against Doe in any way. The court of appeals noted that the government had
not made a formal request for statutory use immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003.
680 F.2d at 337. Section 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the
witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Section 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district
court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the
United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to
give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General,
the Dcputy Attvincy Gcacrai or any designated Assistant Attorney General,
request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary
to the public interest, and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
50. Doe, 104 S.Ct. at 1241.
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noted that the challenged subpoenas did not require Doe to provide any form of oral testimony, but demanded only the production of existing records-records that had been freely and routinely
generated in the ordinary course of Doe's business.5 ' The Court
reasoned that in these circumstances the "preparation of the papers
was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence," either of Doe or anyone else. 5 2 Accordingly, finding no element of governmental compulsion, the
Court held that the contents of the subpoenaed records did not
qualify for the fifth amendment privilege. 3
The Court did agree, however, that the grand jury subpoenas
would force Doe to produce records, and that this act could itself
' Inhave both "testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect. '"54
deed, the Court found a "real" and "substantial" risk that the
forced act of production would incriminate Doe through "implicit" admissions concerning the existence and authenticity of the
subpoenaed papers. 5 To illustrate the point, the Court noted that
if Doe were forced to produce the documents he would thereby
"relieve the government of the need for authentication" in any subsequent criminal proceeding. 6
51. Id. at 1241-42.
52. The Court found that the quoted language from Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 409-10 (1976), applied "with equal force" to the Doe facts. Doe, 104 S.Ct. at 1242.
53. Doe, 104 S.Ct. at 1242. Inan opinion joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's holding that the contents of the subpoenaed records were
not privileged. Doe, 104 S.Ct. at 1245 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). According to Justice Marshall, the Third Circuit's judgment "did not rest upon
the disposition of this issue" and the Court therefore erred by "reaching out to decide it."
Id.
In like manner, Justice Stevens asserted that the basis for the Third Circuit's decision
"turned, not on any suggestion that the contents of the documents were privileged, but
rather on the significance of the act of producing them." 104 S.Ct. at 1246 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens therefore insisted that the
Court had engaged in "poor appellate practice" by deciding a question that was not necessary to dispose of the court of appeals' judgment. Id. at 1246.
In a footnote, the majority replied to Justice Stevens by reiterating that it read the
Third Circuit's opinion as "holding that the contents of the subpoenaed records were
privileged." 104 S.Ct. at 1245, n.18. In this light, the majority reasoned, a reversal is
necessary to prevent Doe from arguing on remand that the contents of the records are
privileged under the Third Circuit's decision. Id.
54. Doe, 104 S.Ct. at 1242.
55. Id. at 1243 n.13. The Court based this conclusion on the district court's factual
findings, as affirmed by the Third Circuit. Id. at 1243. The Court noted that traditionally it has been reluctant to "disturb findings of fact in which two courts below have
concurred." Id.
56. Doe, 104 S.Ct. at 1243 n.13. The Court added that the government is not foreclosed from rebutting the claim of privilege by producing evidence that possession, existence and authentication are a "foregone conclusion." Id. (quoting Fisher v. United
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For this reason, the Court held that the act of producing the
records could not be compelled "without a statutory grant of use
immunity pursuant to §§ 6002 and 6003.""7 Under this approach,
the government could not obtain the "contents" of the records
without immunizing the "testimonial aspects" of the compelled act
of production. By virtue of such a grant of limited immunity, the
government would be prevented in any subsequent prosecution
from relying on the holder's act of production to authenticate the
documents or otherwise establish their relevance."'
Thus, while adopting the "act of production" rationale of the
lower courts, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's holding that the contents of the subpoenaed records are protected by
the fifth amendment. In so doing, the Court reaffirmed the validity
of the major principle of the Fisherand Andresen decisions. Under
that principle, "[i]f the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is
present and the contents of the documents are not privileged." 59
The key to the principle lies in its requirement of a causal link
between the act of compulsion and the creation of the testimonial
evidence. If the evidence is not created through an act of official
compulsion, it is not privileged no matter how "incriminating" or
States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)). In Doe, however, the government failed to make such a
showing. 104 S. Ct. at 1243 n.13.
57. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1245. For the text of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003, see supra
note 49.
Like the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the government's suggestion to uphold a doctrine of "constructive use immunity." Id. at 1244. Under that doctrine, the "courts would impose a requirement on the [g]overnment not to use the
incriminatory aspects of the act of production against the person claiming the privilege
even though the statutory procedures [of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003] have not been
followed." Id. The Court noted, however, that Congress had given certain officials in the
Department of Justice the exclusive authority to grant use immunity. Id. Accordingly,
the Court declined to "extend the jurisdiction of courts to include prospective grants of
use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires." Id.
58. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). It bears noting that the
authentication requirement of Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) can usually be satisfied in a wide
variety of ways, most of which are fairly routine. In the case of business records, for
exampl,

!he Ac
doeurnent
....
can

i..i.tue

by any el.ioyee who made the entries or

saw the entries being made, or by any individual who is merely familiar with the company's record-keeping procedures. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 609 F.2d 1294, 130102 (9th Cir. 1979). If the records were prepared solely by the holder of the documents,
they can still be authenticated by expert or nonexpert handwriting analysis, FED. R.
EVID. 901(b)(3), or even by their "appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns or
other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances." FED. R.
EVID. 901(a)(4).
59. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1242 n.10.

United States v. Doe

1985]

"testimonial" its contents. 6°
With this principle, the Court has fashioned a coherent and unifying approach to the problem of documentary subpoenas and the
fifth amendment. To be sure, the Court has not yet expressly decided whether the privilege applies to the contents of an individual's private, non-commercial papers. Yet such papers seem
equally subject to the Doe-Fisher rationale: they are, after all, no
less "voluntarily-created" than the business records of a sole proprietor. Not suprisingly, therefore, in a concurring opinion in the
Doe decision, Justice O'Connor wrote to "make explicit what is
implicit in the analysis of [the majority] opinion; that the Fifth
Amendment provides absolutely
no protection for the contents of
'6 1
private papers of any kind."
If this view is correct-and it is plainly supported by language in
Fisher62-then what does it reveal about the Court's perception of
the values and policies of the fifth amendment? To answer the
question, we must first examine the different theories used to explain the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination.
IV.

THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Widely viewed as a "great landmark in man's struggle to make
himself civilized,

' 63

the privilege against self-incrimination is a cor-

nerstone in the modern system of American criminal justice-a
right so "cherished" and "fundamental" as to "go to the nature of
a free man and to his relationship to the state."'
Suprisingly,
however, while the privilege is clearly a "fundamental part of our
constitutional fabric,

' 65

its meaning and rationale have been the

60. Under this formulation, then, the evidence must meet three criteria to be privileged: it must be testimonial; it must be incriminating; and it must be a product of governmental compulsion. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
61. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1245 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In disputing this contention,
Justice Marshall noted that Doe "presented nothing remotely close to the question that
Justice O'Connor eagerly poses and answers." 104 S. Ct. at 1245 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Justice Marshall's view, the question of whether
the fifth amendment protects the contents of documents was "obviated by the Court of
Appeals' rulings relating to the act of production and statutory use immunity." 104 S.
Ct. at 1245-46. Justice Marshall also noted his continuing belief that under the fifth
amendment "there are certain documents no person ought to be compelled to produce at
the Government's request." Id. at 1246 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
431-32 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
62. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n.1l (1976).
63. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
64. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967)(Fortas, J., dissenting).
65. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964).
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subject of considerable debate and uncertainty.66 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has freely acknowledged, "the law and the lawyers
• . .have never made up their minds just what [the privilege]
is
67
supposed to do or just whom it is intended to protect.
Furthermore, a surprising number of distinguished jurists and
scholars have been highly critical of the privilege in its modem
form. 68 According to these critics-including such notable authorities as Wigmore, Pound, McCormick and Friendly 69 -the right
against self-incrimination has been interpreted so broadly that it
reaches far beyond its original purpose and rationale. This development, the critics argue, is especially striking in view of the limits
placed on other forms of testimonial privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege or the marital communications privilege.7 0
While these privileges promote relationships of unquestioned social
66. Wigmore identifies no less then twelve different justifications for the privilege,
three of which are especially notable: (1) the privilege "prevents torture and other inhumane treatment of a human being"; (2) it encourages the government to do a "complete
and competent independent investigation," and (3) it contributes to a "fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load." J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 297-318 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). For other discussions of the different values said to underlie the fifth
amendment, see Gerstein, supra note 3; McKay, Self-Incriminationand the New Privacy,
1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193 (1967); O'Brien, The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits and the Burger Court, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 26 (1979); Ritchie, supra
note 3; Harvard Note, supra note 5.
67. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (quoting Kalven, Invoking
the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC
Sci. 181, 182 (1953)).
Judge Friendly has argued that this "lack of conviction and consensus" provides a
"curious basis for making a greatly expanded notion of the privilege the veritable linch
pin of a Bill of Rights." Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671, 684 (1968).
68. See, e.g., L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959);
Friendly, supra note 67; MCCORMICK, LAW AND THE FUTURE: EVIDENCE, 51 Nw. U.
L. REV. 218 (1956); Pound, Legal Interrogationof PersonsAccused or Suspected of Crime,
24 J. CRIM, L., C. & P.S. 1014 (1934); Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5
HARV. L. REV. 71, 87 (1891).
Perhaps the earliest notable criticism of the privilege was provided more than 150 years
ago by Jeremy Bentham. Bentham, A Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 446 (Bowring ed. 1843). Even then, Bentham found that a major
obstacle to a criticism of the privilege was:
By assuming [the propriety of the rule, as a proposition too plainly true to admit of dispute] as true, you . . .represent all men . ..whose opinions are
worth regarding, as joining in the opinion; and by this means. . . you present
. . .the fear of incurring the indignation or contempt of all reasonable men, by
presuming to disbelieve or doubt what all such reasonable men are assured of.
Id. at 451 (quoted in Friendly, supra note 67, at 679).
69. See supra note 68.
70. Friendly, supra note 67, at 680.
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value, the fifth amendment "extends, by hypothesis, only to persons who have been breakers
of the criminal law or believe they
'7 1
may be charged as such."
But in what sense has the privilege been unduly expanded? On
this point, the critics' argument has two parts. They first note that
the historic purpose of the right against self-incrimination is to
guard against "roving inquisitions" and other abuses in the investigation of criminal activity.72 They then argue that this purpose is
not furthered by forbidding all inquiry of the accused in an orderly
trial before a neutral magistrate. 73 Indeed, according to the critics,
there is no reason why an individual who has been charged by a
valid indictment based on "reasonable" and "independent" evidence should not be obliged to answer questions in a proper judicial setting. The critics thus claim that "[j]ustice . . .would not
perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly
inquiry" in the course of a judicial proceeding. 74
Dean Wigmore set forth the substance of this argument in an
early plea for a "general freedom of questioning":
71. Id.
72. McCormick thus writes that the privilege arose in response to the "evils of the
fishing expedition, the inquisition of the suspect about all of his past life without any
previous charge being laid against him, and the barbarous evil of torture." MCCORMICK,
supra note 68, at 221.
73. The critics argue that the privilege in its early form drew a sharp distinction
between the pre-indictment interrogation of suspects and the questioning at trial of a
properly-charged defendant. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 221. According to
Wigmore, when the privilege first arose in the early seventeenth century, "it was not
doubted that a suspect could be made to respond to questions once he was properly
accused; it was just that a person could not be compelled to provide the first evidence
against himself." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2251, at 317 n.ll. See also Friendly,
supra note 67, at 677-78; MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 221. "Not until after the triumph of the Parliament over the King and his special courts did the notion grow up of a
special prohibition in the ordinary courts against any judicial interrogation which would
require a man to confess a crime." MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 221-222.
74. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). In this vein, Dean Pound
proposed that "there should be express provision for a legal examination of suspected or
accused persons before a magistrate; that those to be examined should be allowed to have
counsel present to safeguard their rights; that provision should be made for taking down
the evidence so as to guarantee accuracy." Pound, supra note 68 at 1017.
Marvin Frankel, a former district court judge for the Southern District of New York,
has modified this proposal by adding two provisions: (1) the suspect should have the
right to refuse to be questioned before the magistrate; and (2) the prosecution should be
permitted to comment at trial on any such refusal. M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 9899 (1978). See also W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 76-81 (1967) (author
proposes interrogation before a judicial officer, contending that such interrogation is central to the drive for broader discovery in criminal proceedings).
In 1972 the English Law Revision Committee "proposed that the accused be formally
called to the stand, but only after the prosecution had already made out a case which
would justify conviction." Gerstein, supra note 3, at 350 n.35.
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I imagine that to-day the average lawyer, as well as the average
layman, if asked for his candid opinion, would admit that in the
nature of things there is no reason why, if an accused person is
innocent, he should be unwilling to say so, and to explain the
facts of his conduct and vindicate himself,-always assuming, of
course, that a charge has been made with proper solemnities, and
that he is not called upon, in inquisitorial style, to answer hasty
accusations without weight.75

Echoing the same theme, Professor McCormick wrote that the
modern right against self-incrimination
goes far beyond the evils from which the privilege sprang. It goes
far beyond the demands of ordinary morality, which sees nothing
wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason, about particular
misdeeds of which he has been suspected and charged. Safeguards for official interrogation are needed, of course. . .But to
say he shall be
free of questioning altogether about his crimes
6
goes too far.1

Whatever merit these views might have, they have not influenced the decisions of the Supreme Court. In the course of the
past century, the Court has adopted a generally expansive view of
the fifth amendment, applying the privilege to a wide variety of
settings, including, of course, the trial itself.77 In so doing, the
Court has relied, at one time or another, on at least three different
theories of the purpose and rationale of the right against self-in75. Wigmore, supra note 68, at 86. Wigmore later modified his position to accept the
privilege against self-incrimination, but urged that it "be kept within limits the strictest
possible." 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 3102 (1st ed. 1905); see also Friendly,
supra note 67, at 673.
76. MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 222.
77. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983) (deponent's civil deposition testimony, closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, without duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, immunized testimony within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 6002, and therefore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (state statute,
which provided for termination if an officer of a political party subpoenaed by a grand
jury concerning the conduct of his office refused to testify or to waive immunity against
subsequent criminal prosecution); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (New York
statutory provisions which required public contracts to provide that if a contractor refuses to waive immunity or to testify concerning his state contracts, his existing contracts
may be canceled and he shall be disqualified from further transactions with the state for
five years, and further required disqualification from contracting upon a person's failure
to waive immunity or to answer questions regarding his state transactions, violate contractor's constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination); Mathis v. United
States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (state prisoner questioned by an Internal Revenue Service investigator about certain tax returns in a "routine tax investigation" entitled to warnings of
right to silence and right to counsel); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutor's and trial court's comments on the defendant's failure to testify violated the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment).
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crimination. These theories can be broadly described as: (1) the
truth-seeking rationale; (2) the individual dignity rationale; and (3)
the privacy rationale.7 8 To each of these theories we may now
turn.
A. Promoting The Integrity Of the Truth-Seeking Enterprise
As John Hart Ely has noted, the "privilege against self-incrimination. . . has a lot to do with wanting to find the truth: coerced
confessions are less likely to be reliable." 79 This well-known idea
underlies the single most important and pragmatic rationale for the
right against self-incrimination: the privilege serves to promote the
integrity of the truth-seeking enterprise in the administration of
criminal justice.8 0 According to this theory, the right against selfincrimination enhances the fairness and reliability of the truthseeking process in several important ways.
First, the privilege serves to eliminate many of the abuses associated with an "inquisitorial" approach to the investigation of crime.
According to accepted views, the police use of the inquisitorial
method
breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and
torture. If there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a
right to an expected answer-that is, to a confession of guilt.
Thus, the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately,
the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad
78. While these theories incorporate the major values influencing the Court's view of
the Fifth Amendment, the list is by no means exhaustive. In Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court provided a more comprehensive account, stating
that the privilege
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play
which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," ... our distrust of self-deprecating statements; and our realization
that the privilege, while sometimes a "shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Id. at 55. (citations omitted).
79. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95 (1980). This view-adopted by the
Court in recent cases such as Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1974) and Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985)-stands in sharp contrast to Justice Stewart's earlier
claim that the "Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct
to the ascertainment of truth." Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16
(1966).
80. See J. ELY, supra note 79, at 95; Gerstein, supra note 2, at 350.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 16

system."s

Accordingly, by barring all forms of coercive official interrogation,

the right against self-incrimination discourages the use of torture
and other kinds of physical abuse in the investigation of a crime.8 2
The privilege therefore insures that the investigative process comports with the basic standards of decency and fairness demanded
by a civilized society. s3
Second, the privilege works to improve the accuracy of factual
determinations in criminal trials. It achieves this goal in two basic
ways. First, it excludes from evidence the "inherently unreliable"
confessions of tortured or coerced defendantsa 4-a benefit that the
81. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d Ed. 1940). See also Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896).
82. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974). In a sense, this function of the self-incrimination privilege is equivalent to the "voluntariness" inquiry of the
Due Process Clause. Under that inquiry, a suspect's statements will not be admitted if
they were obtained by techniques and methods offensive to due process, or under circumstances in which the suspect did not have an opportunity to exercise a free and unconstrained will. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1963).
83. It might be argued that the deterrence of inhumane methods of police interrogation is more properly viewed as a separate rationale for the self-incrimination privilege,
rather than a component part of the truth-seeking theory. This argument is bolstered by
the fact that the prohibition of tortured confessions is not always consistent with the
"search for truth" in criminal litigation. In some cases, after all, the use of torture could
lead to a truthful confession whose exclusion from evidence would only impede the full
discovery of facts in a criminal trial.
As a general matter, however, there is good reason to hold that "coerced confessions
are less likely to be reliable," J. ELY, supra note 79, at 95, since the use of force in police
interrogations may well "cause a defendant to accuse himself falsely." Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23, 449 (1974). It is in this sense that the exclusion of
tortured confessions can fairly be viewed as generally serving the same goal as that
ascribed to the truth-seeking rationale-namely, the accurate determination of guilt or
innocence in criminal litigation.
It is also in this sense that the prohibition of inhumane methods of police interrogation
stands in sharp contrast to other "fair process norms" that operate to vindicate individual
values by excluding evidence of unquestioned truth from the adjudicative process. See
infra note 91-108 and accompanying text. See also Arenella, Foreword: Rethinking the
Functions of CriminalProcedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies,
72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200-05 (1983).
84. J. ELY, supra note 79, at 95. It is sometimes said that the privilege also protects
the innocent defendant who fears prejudicial impeachment or an otherwise ineffective
performance on the stand. E. CLEARY. MCCORMICK oN F.VirnFNC 7RA-R7 (1Q76) It is
not likely, however, that
an innocent defendant, properly advised, will exercise the privilege in order to
avoid prejudice from his unprepossessing appearance, from his nervousness, his
halting speech or from his inability to cope with a clever or unscrupulous crossexaminer. The dangers of such prejudice are generally more remote than the
almost certain risk of an adverse inference from the defendant's silence.
Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 687, 689-701 (1951).
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Supreme Court has long recognized:
Cases which involve the Self-Incrimination Clause must, by definition, involve an element of coercion, since the Clause provides
only that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself. And cases involving statements often depict severe pressures which may override a particular suspect's insistence on innocence. Fact situations ranging from classical third-degree
torture, to prolonged isolation from family or friends in a hostile
setting, or to a simple desire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation
end, all might be sufficient to cause a defendant to accuse himself
falsely.85
Thus, the exclusionary rule of the fifth amendment operates to reduce the risk that the fact-finding process will be distorted by an
untrustworthy form of evidence.
Finally, by barring the use of all evidence obtained through coercive interrogation, the privilege against self-incrimination compels
the state to build its case on the basis of a thorough and independent investigation."6 In so doing, the privilege works to guarantee
an accusatorialsystem in which the state relies not on confessions
extracted from unwilling subjects, but on evidence secured through
its own independent efforts.8 7 And this, in turn, provides yet another "assurance that every person convicted is in fact guilty as
charged." 88
The crux of the truth-seeking rationale thus lies in its view of the
fifth amendment as a means of protecting the integrity of the factfinding process from the evils of coercive interrogations. According to this view, the government's use of "actual coercion" in the
interrogation of individuals not only leads to physical abuse, but
also results in unreliable evidence that impairs the accurate determination of guilt or innocence. Accordingly, the truth-seeking ra85.

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1974).

86. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 118, at 287 (1984). See also Garner
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976); Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436,
460 (1966); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2251, at 309, 317 (1941); Harvard Note, supra
note 5, at 972.
87. Thus, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court noted that "our
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than
by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." 384 U.S. at 460.
See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The objectives of the accusatorial system
of justice are generally held to be (1)protecting the suspect or defendant from abuse and
(2) ensuring the reliability of the fact-finding process. Gerstein, supra note 3, at 381.
There is, accordingly, a close interrelationship among the three principal concerns of the
truth-seeking rationale.
88. E. CLEARY, supra note 86, at 287; Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 972.
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tionale views the fifth amendment as serving an important
utilitarian function by barring the use of all testimonial evidence
created through governmental coercion.8 9
This perspective is fully consistent with the historic origins of
the privilege. The right against self-incrimination arose in the seventeenth century in response to the inquisitorial methods of the
English Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber.9" In those
courts, an "individual could be called before the court and made to
respond to a broad inquiry into his affairs without regard to the
nature or strength of the accusations against him."9' This practice
was at time accompanied by torture, and was often subject to political and religious abuse. 92 For this reason, the practice led ultimately to the adoption of an evidentiary privilege designed to deter
the state from relying on torture or other abuses in the investigation of crime.93 In its early form, the privilege did not bar the
questioning of the defendant at a formal trial in the regular criminal courts. 94 Rather, it prevented the state from compelling a suspect to answer questions prior to any formal charge of criminal
wrongdoing. 9 (It was only in the absence of such a charge that the
individual was "truly being made to accuse himself.") 96 In this
form, the privilege faithfully incorporated the two major concerns
that underlie the modern truth-seeking rationale: (1) it discouraged the state from employing brutal or inhumane tactics in the
questioning of suspects; and (2) it encouraged the government to
base all charges of criminal wrongdoing on reliable evidence obtained through independent investigation.
The truth-seeking rationale is equally compatible with the gen89. Put differently, the truth-seeking theory conceives of the privilege as a "fair process norm" that merits protection within the criminal process because it contributes instrumentally to good criminal law "results." See Arenella, supra note 83, at 224.
90. MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 221. See generally, L. W. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 120, at
250-257 (1954); J. WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 2250, at 267-95.
91. E. CLEARY, supra note 86, at 279.
92. Id. at 280. See also 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 66, at § 2250.
93. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
94. T_ MAR
note 6.0, at !41
14....
,.'I,-J. ..
supra note 66, at 3i7 n.ii;
Friendly, supra note 67, at 677-78; MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 221.
Given that the early privilege did not apply to questioning at a formal trial, the origins
of the right are not compatible with the well-known theory which holds that the purpose
of the privilege is to protect the "dignity" of the guilty defendant from the "cruel
trilemma" of self-incrimination, perjury or contempt. See infra text accompanying notes
99-102.
95. See supra note 66.
96. Friendly, supra note 67, at 677.

United States v. Doe

1985]

eral design of the Constitution's provisions dealing with the criminal process. These provisions-contained principally in the fifth
and sixth amendments-set forth a number of procedural guarantees intended to promote the fairness and reliability of the criminal
fact-finding process. 97 In particular, the "guarantees of grand juries, criminal. . . petit juries, information of the charge, the right
of confrontation, compulsory process and even the assistance of
counsel" are all intended to "ensure a reliable determination" on
the key issue of guilt or innocence. 9s And this, of course, is precisely the role ascribed by the truth-seeking rationale to the privilege against self-incrimination.
The truth-seeking theory is therefore consistent with both the
origins of the privilege and the overall design of the criminal provisions of the Constitution. In a very real sense, accordingly, it embodies the core values of the fifth amendment.
B.

The Protection of the Dignity of the Defendant

A second view of the privilege against self-incrimination holds
that its major purpose is to protect the personal dignity and humanity of the individual defendant. 99 According to this perspective, the privilege
serves the function of assuring that even guilty individuals are
treated in a manner consistent with basic respect for human dignity. Wholly apart from its function in assuring the accuracy of
the guilt-determining process, the privilege demands that even
those guilty of an offense not be compelled beyond a certain extent to participate in the establishment of their own guilt. This is
based upon the feeling that to require participation would be simply too great a violation of the dignity of the individual, whether
or not he is guilty of a criminal offense."°
At the heart of the theory is the recognition that a guilty defendant, if forced to testify at trial, would be confronted with the "cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt." ' That is, he
could only choose either to (1) perjure himself, (2) acknowledge his
97. J. ELY, supra note 79, at 95; Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An
Examination of Continuity and Change in CriminalProcedure,80 COLUM. L. REV. 436,
449 (1980).
98. J. ELY, supra note 79, at 95.
99. E. CLEARY, supra note 86, at 287-88.
100. Id.
101. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). E. CLEARY,supra note
86, at 287. The argument thus runs that "there is simply something immoral-though it
has proved tricky pinning down exactly what it is-about the state's asking somebody
whether he committed a crime and expecting him to answer." J. ELY, supra note 86, at
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guilt; or (3) refuse to testify and be held in contempt. This choice,
according to the theory, is far too cruel to be justifiable:
To place an individual in a position in which his natural instincts
and personal interests dictate that he should lie and then to punish him for lying, or for refusing to lie or violate his natural instincts, is an intolerable invasion of his personal dignity. 102
This view of the fifth amendment is concerned only with the dignity of the guilty defendant. By its very terms, the theory does not
apply to the innocent defendant, for such a defendant is not vulnerable to the "cruel trilemma": that is, he is not motivated either to
commit perjury or to make a confession, for he is not guilty of the
alleged offense.
The theory thus separates the fifth amendment from all notions
of "protecting the innocent" or "discovering the truth," and focuses instead on the dignity of the guilty defendant. It rests, accordingly, on a rationale that conceives of the privilege not as a
utilitarian "means to an end," but as a substantive "end in itself"-an important individual right that has as its sole purpose
the protection of the individual defendant from "overreaching"
state power. 103
Such a view is part of a larger model which holds that the criminal process can properly be used to promote ends that are wholly
unrelated to discovering the truth or enforcing the criminal law."o
96. As Dean Ely intimates, the immorality of such questioning is not obvious to everyone. Judge Friendly writes:
No parent would teach such a doctrine to his children; the lesson parents
preach is that a ... misdeed, even a serious one, will generally be forgiven; a
failure to make a clean breast of it will not be. Every hour of the day people are
asked to explain their conduct to parents, employers and teachers.
Friendly, supra note 67, at 680. See also S. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT 73 (1963).
102. E. CLEARY, supra note 86, at 287. See also United States v. Grunewald, 233
F.2d 556, 591 (Frank, J., dissenting); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 63, at 7.
As against this theory, Bentham argued that "whatever hardship there is in a man's

being punished, that and no more is there in his thus being made to criminate himself."
Bentham, supra note 68, at 231 (emphasis added). From this point of view, a guilty
individual who is compelled to testify is subject to no greater hardship than that which
the community has already deemed to be appropriate-namely, the prescribed penalty
fer +he off,ns. committed by that individuai.
103. See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 83, at 200-01; O'Brien, supra note 66, at 43.
104. This theory corresponds to what Professor Herbert L. Packer described in his
classic work, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, as the "Due Process Model" of

the criminal process. H. L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 163-73
(1968). According to Professor Packer, the Due Process Model is rooted in a fear of
official power:
Precisely because of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive
power of the state, the criminal process must, in this model, be subjected to
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According to this model, the criminal process is designed in part to
vindicate certain individual values by imposing limits on the
proper exercise of official power. 105 The model further holds that
such limits are properly enforced through rules that exclude relevant and trustworthy evidence, even though such rules impair the
capacity of the criminal process to make an accurate assessment of
factual guilt. °6 The model thus stands in sharp contrast to another, more traditional view, which holds that the central mission
of the criminal process is to determine guilt or innocence, and
thereby enforce the substantive commands of the criminal law. 107
Yet, according to its staunchest proponents, the model offers a
view of the criminal process that is most consistent with a civilized
and humane society." 8
controls that prevent it from operating with maximal efficiency . . . [TIhe proponents of the Due Process Model would accept with considerable equanimity a
substantial diminution in the efficiency with which the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official oppression of the individual.
Id. at 166.
105. H. L. PACKER, supra note 104, at 165-66; Arenella, supra note 83, at 210;
Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of CriminalProcedure: A
Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 574 (1973).
106. H. L. PACKER, supra note 104, at 168. This willingness to exclude relevant
evidence sharply distinguishes the Due Process Model from another, competing theory of
the criminal process-what Professor Packer described as the "Crime Control Model."
Id. at 158-61, 168. As Packer noted,
[i]n theory, the Crime Control Model can tolerate rules that forbid illegal arrests, unreasonable searches, coercive interrogations, and the like. What it cannot tolerate is the vindication of those rules in the criminal procedure itself
through the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained or through the reversal of
convictions in cases where the criminal process has breached the rules laid
down for its observance.
Id. at 167-68.
It bears noting that the vindication of so-called "fair process norms" within the criminal justice system is not an "inherentfunction of any procedural system." Arenella, supra
note 83, at 203 n. 111 (emphasis added). On the contrary, in theory at least, such norms
can fairly be vindicated outside the criminal justice system through remedies such as
administrative sanctions or civil damages. This point is clearly evident in the fact that the
legal systems of continental Europe have not embraced the American notion that criminal proceedings can justifiably be used for "purposes other than those of establishing the
truth and enforcing the substantive criminal law." Damaska, supra note 105, at 586.
107. See supra note 106. This theory corresponds to what Professor Packer described
as the "Crime Control Model" of the criminal process. H. L. PACKER, supra note 104, at
158-62. As Professor Packer notes, the Crime Control Model "requires that primary
attention be paid to the efficiency with which the criminal process operates to screen
suspects, determine guilt, and secure appropriate dispositions of persons convicted of
crime." Id. at 158.
108. One variation on this theme asserts that the privilege enhances the humanity of
the criminal justice system by making the criminal trial more nearly a "contest between
equals," rather than a mismatch between the "lone suspect" and the "huge investigatory
and prosecutorial apparatus of the state." E. CLEARY, supra note 84, at 288.
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C. The Protection of PersonalPrivacy
A third view of the self-incrimination clause ascribes to the privilege the broad purpose of protecting the privacy and autonomy of
the individual. °9 According to this view, the major goal of the
self-incrimination right is to preserve an "inviolate enclave" within
which each person can lead a "private life free from unwarranted
intrusion and disclosure."' 10 The theory further holds that this
goal can be fully realized only by protecting a "core of personal
communications, papers and effects" from all forms of "non-willed
government procurement."''
The theory therefore asserts that the
privilege against self-incrimination operates to bar the compulsory
production of an individual's papers and documents, as well as his
actual "testimony. "
A major premise of the privacy theory is the notion that papers
and other types of written communications are mere "physical extensions of an individual's thoughts and knowledge."" 2 According
to this premise, the papers of an individual often disclose as much
as the individual himself could disclose if forced to answer questions directly.'
Accordingly, under this logic, the privilege
against self-incrimination can adequately protect a zone of personal privacy only if it applies to all personal papers and records,
including documents pertaining to the individual's business."'
The privacy theory found its earliest expression in the 1886 case
of Boyd v. United States.' '5 In Boyd, the Court rejected the claim
that the "seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in
evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him
to be a witness against himself."" 6 The Court therefore held that
the compulsory production of an individual's incriminating private7
papers violates the right against compelled self-incrimination."
The Court noted that a contrary holding would "suit the purposes
of despotic power," and would not agree with the "pure atmos109. Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 971-72. See also Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 415 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("history and [the Supreme Court] have
construed the constitutional privilege to safeguard against governmental intrusions of
personal privacy to compel either self-incriminating oral statements or the production of
self-i
ig cvidenc recofded in une's private books and papers").
110. Harvard Note, supra note 5,at 985-86.
Ill. Id. at 988.
112. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 486 (1976) (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
113. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J.,concurring).
114. Id. at 426-7.
115. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
116. Id. at 633.
117. Id. at 630.
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phere of political liberty and personal freedom" enjoyed under the
Constitution. 118
The Boyd opinion thus adopted the theory that the fifth amendment is designed to protect the right of each individual to enjoy a
"private enclave where he may lead a private life." 9 In United
States v. Doe, the sole proprietor relied on the same theory to support the claim that the contents of1 his
business records were pro20
disclosure.
compulsory
from
tected
V.

DOE AND THE VALUES OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

In deciding United States v. Doe, the Supreme Court did not refer to any underlying rationale for the fifth amendment. Nevertheless, the opinion can be usefully analyzed from the standpoint of
each of the three theories presented above.
Turning first to the truth-seeking rationale, this theory is fully
consistent with the Doe holding concerning the contents of subpoenaed records. As noted earlier, the crux of that holding lay in the
requirement of a causal link between the act of governmental compulsion and the creation of the incriminating records.1 2 ' This focus
on the role of actual compulsion in the creation of the testimonial
evidence is eminently well-founded from the standpoint of the
truth-seeking theory. For if the records are created voluntarily-if
they are not the product of governmental compulsion-their reliability is not open to question, and there is no reason to exclude
them from evidence. 22 On the contrary, their admission at trial
would serve a useful purpose by aiding in the accurate determination of guilt or innocence.
Furthermore, the government's use of the legal process to obtain
the records does not pose a risk of physical abuse or implicate any
other form of inhumane treatment.123 It does not, in other words,
bear "any resemblance to the historical practices at which the right
against self-incrimination was aimed."' 24 Nor does it undermine
the accusatorial system,' 21 or otherwise alter the state's obligation
118. Id. at 632.
119. Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 951-56.
120. United States v. Doe, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 1242 n.8 (1984).
121. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
122. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976); Friendly, supra note 67, at
702.
123. Friendly, supra note 67, at 702.
124. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 533, 444 (1974).
125. In Andresen v. Maryland, the Court described the main features of the accusatorial system as follows:
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to gather reliable evidence through independent investigation.
While the truth-seeking theory is thus compatible with the major
thrust of the Doe holding,'26 the same cannot be said for the individual dignity rationale. It seems clear, after all, that the compelled production of incriminating records is no less an "assault on
dignity" than the compulsion of testimony in court: in both cases,
the guilty individual is made to act as an "instrument of his own
condemnation."' 2 7 Indeed, a subpoena calling for the production
of incriminating records confronts the guilty suspect with what
amounts to the same "cruel trilemma": he can either (1) produce
the records and thereby incriminate himself; (2) destroy the
records and run the risk of an "obstruction of justice" prosecution;
2
or (3) refuse to produce the records and be held in contempt. 1
But whatever cruelty is involved in this choice, it was not
enough to persuade the Doe Court that the fifth amendment should
protect the records of a sole proprietor. On the contrary, in the
entire course of the Doe opinion, the Court did not mention the
"cruel trilemma," but held instead that the contents of the records
were not privileged despite their incriminating nature.
The privacy theory is similarly at odds with both the rationale
and the holding of the Doe opinion. Indeed, in both Fisher and
The requirement of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
protection of the accused from confessions extorted through whatever form of
police pressures, the right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate, the right to
assistance of counsel, . . . the duty to advise an accused of his constitutional
rights-these are all characteristics of the accusatorial system and manifestations of its demands.
427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949)). In Andresen, the Court found that these key attributes of the accusatorial system were not "endangered by the introduction of business records 'independently secured through skillful
investigation.'" 427 U.S. at 477.
126. One aspect of the Doe holding that is inconsistent with the truth-seeking rationale is the notion that the compelled act of production has a testimonial importance warranting fifth amendment protection. As one commentator has noted, "[ilt
is hard to
perceive how the issuance of a subpoena for the production of preexisting papers entails a
significant risk that compliance will be coerced in a manner likely to affect the reliability
of the evidence." Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 973 n.170.
127. Louissell, CriminalDiscovery and Self Incrimination, 53 CAL. L. REV. 89, 95
(1965).
.........
On
poinL,judgX
..
e FIrn
ar11ILuAL
t L n
uucumentary subpoenas "[t]he 'cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt' . . . reduces to a dilemma. This occurs, not as before by elimination of contempt, which should apply to a
refusal to produce documents, but because there is no real possibility of perjury."
Friendly, supra note 67, at 702. There is, however, the possibility of an obstruction of
justice prosecution. Indeed, just as the guilty defendant is powerfully motivated to provide false testimony, so too is he motivated to obstruct justice by destroying incriminating
records before they fall into the hands of the government. In a very real sense, accordingly, the "cruel trilemma" arises with equal force in the case of documentary subpoenas.
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Doe, the Court squarely rejected the notion that the fifth amendment protects a generalized privacy right in the contents of records
or documents. 2 9 Finding that "[s]everal of Boyd's express or implicit declarations have not stood the test of time,"'' 30 the Fisher
Court stressed that the fourth amendment-and not the fifth-is
the provision directly dealing with the "subject of personal privacy."''
In the fourth amendment, the Court explained, the
Framers
struck a balance so that when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the
invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant will issue.
They did not seek in still another Amendment-the Fifth-to
achieve a general protection of privacy but
to deal with the more
13 2
specific issue of compelled incrimination.
Accordingly, the Court remained firmly committed to the "view
that the Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.' "133
Thus, of the three major theories, the truth-seeking rationale is
the only one that fits neatly with the Doe holding concerning the
contents of subpoenaed records. This is not to say that the
Supreme Court has adopted the theory to the exclusion of all
others, 34 or even that the Court relied on the theory in deciding
Doe. But the truth-seeking rationale is at least compatible with
Doe's focus on the role of actual compulsion in the creation of testimonial evidence.
More broadly, the truth-seeking rationale is also compatible
with the heightened interest of the Burger Court in promoting the
accuracy of the criminal fact-finding process. This interest is
clearly evident in several recent decisions in which the Court has
refused to exclude evidence that would plainly contribute to an accurate determination of guilt or innocence.
For example, in four recent decisions dealing with the fifth
amendment, the Court has reached the same basic result that it
reached in Doe: it has upheld the admissibility of probative and
reliable evidence on the ground that such evidence was not the
product of "actual" governmental coercion. In South Dakota v.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 n.8 (1984).
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 301, 407 (1976).
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,233 n.7 (1975)).
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
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Neville,135 the Court found that a driver's refusal to submit to a
blood-alcohol test was not a form of "compelled" testimony and
therefore could properly be admitted in a prosecution for drunk
driving. Similarly, in Minnesota v. Murphy,13 6 the Court held that
a defendant's admissions to his probation officer were not made
involuntarily and therefore did not qualify for the fifth amendment
privilege. Finally, in Quarles v. New York "I and Oregon v. Elstad,1 3 s the Court held that the failure to give Miranda warnings
was not tantamount to "actual" coercion, and did not justify the
exclusion of all evidence obtained as a result of the unwarned
39
admissions. 1
In yet another area-the law of search and seizure-the Court
recently modified the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment to
further the "search for truth" in criminal litigation. In United
States v. Leon, 11° the Court upheld the admission of evidence obtained through a "good faith" reliance on a defective search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court emphasized the social costs that often result
when evidence of unquestioned reliability is excluded from criminal trials. "Particularly when law enforcement officials have acted
in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor,"
the Court wrote, "the magnitude of the benefit conferred on...
guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice
system." 14 '
Similarly, in Nix v. Williams, 142 the Court refused to apply the
exclusionary rule to reliable evidence that "inevitably" would have
been discovered through independent investigation, even though it
was actually obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel. In so doing, the Court stressed that the exclusion of such
evidence would "do nothing whatever to promote the integrity of
the trial process," since the defendant would not suffer any preju135. Id.
136. 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
137. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
138. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
139. In New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) the Court recognized a "public
safety" exception to the Miranda requirements, and upheld the admissibility of a gun
obtained after an arrested suspect identified its whereabouts. In Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.
Ct. 1285 (1985), the Court held that the fifth amendment does not requires the suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights,
solely because the police had obtained an earlier unwarned but voluntary confession from
the suspect.
140. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
141. Id. at 3419.
142. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
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dice that he would have avoided in the absence of police misconduct. 143 In these circumstances, the Court reasoned, the failure to
admit the evidence would serve only to "inflict a wholly unacceptable burden on the administration of criminal justice."'" "We are
unwilling," the Court concluded, "to impose added burdens on the
already difficult task of proving guilt in criminal cases by enlarging
the barrier to placing evidence of unquestioned truth before
juries."145
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is thus clear that the truth-seeking rationale is consistent not
only with the Doe-Fisher principle, but also with the recent movement of the Burger Court toward a "guilt or innocence" model of
the criminal process.146 Under this model, the Court has shown a
heightened interest in the accurate determination of guilt or innocence, and a pronounced reluctance to "sacrifice the truth in individual cases on the altar of broader social goals." '47 From this
point of view, the Court has achieved in the area of documentary
subpoenas the same result that it has realized in other areas of
criminal procedure: it has embraced a rule that reduces the "enormous societal cost" of excluding evidence of "unquestioned truth"
143. Id. at 2510-11; Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L. REV. 87, 125
(1984).
144. 104 S. Ct. at 2511.
145. Id. at 2509 n.5.
146. As Professor Arenella has noted, the Burger Court has not adopted a "pure"
guilt or innocence model, since any system of criminal procedure must, to some extent at
least, serve "functions apart from promoting reliable guilt determinations." Arenella,
supra note 83, at 187, 228. Nevertheless, the Burger Court's recent decisions clearly
reflect
several distinctive themes of crime control ideology: judicial deregulation of
state and federal criminal justice officials, hostility to fair process norms that
impair the state's capacity to detect and punish the factually guilty, and a pronounced tendency to view individual rights from a utilitarian perspective that
defines their content in light of their functional impact on the system's capacity
to promote social control.
Arenella, supra note 83, at 247.
For two conflicting views of the Supreme Court's increasingly utilitarian approach to
legal problems, see Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?
98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985) and Easterbrook, Method, Result and Authority: A Reply,
98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985).
147. Seidman, supra note 97, at 446. Writing in 1980, Professor Seidman argued that
the Court often employed the rhetoric of the guilt or innocence model, while "succumb[ing] to the familiar temptation to use the system for purposes unrelated to the
determination of factual guilt." Seidman, supra note 97, at 449. It is, of course, unclear
whether Professor Seidman would apply the same argument to the 1984 Term.
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in the adminstration of criminal justice. 48 And herein may well lie
the importance of the Doe holding in the development of the
Court's view of the purpose and values of the privilege against selfincrimination.

148.

Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).

